Introduction
The committee on Ethics of the American Heart Association was formally constituted in 1971 as a standing committee of the Central Committee. The primary function of the Committee is to serve as a fact-finding and deliberative body with responsibility for providing in-depth discussions of ethical issues that are of actual or potential concern to the Association. These issues, of course, relate predominantly to the cardiovascular interests of the Association in regard both to research and to patient care. The Committee does not consider its role as either regulatory or judgmental. Rather it seeks to bring to the attention of members of the American Heart Association and other interested physicians, ethical issues that deserve consideration and are important to cardiologists and cardiovascular investigators everywhere.
As a committee on ethics, this one is unusual in several ways. It is a standing committee with members who serve for five years. It discusses one major topic per year and prepares a summary of that discussion. In contrast to many previous groups which have deliberated ethical issues, its membership* includes a goodly proportion of people who are actively involved in clinical investigation and/or patient care people who, in fact, are "doers of the word and not hearers only" and finally, it has avoided the temptation of providing strict guidelines. Rather it hopes to raise the level of consciousness of investigators and clinicians alike about matters of deep human concern which may not have come to their attention.
The current topic, Ethical Implications of Investigations in Seriously and Critically Ill Patients, was chosen for several reasons. Such studies pose different ethical considerations than do those in nor-mal controls, the mildly, moderately or chronically ill, patients with terminal malignancies, or the mentally retarded. Much has been written about the ethical concerns in studying the latter types of individuals but no previous discussion has been addressed to seriously and critically ill patients. This is so in spite of the fact that increasingly these patients participate in investigations as, for instance, in myocardial infarction research units or in centers dealing with acute stroke.
In considering this topic, the Committee on Ethics did not find it necessary to establish a new code of ethics. There are several such available which have been generally endorsed by medical and medical investigative organizations and have had the scrutiny of professional ethicists. The best known are the AMA Code of Ethics,1 the Nuremberg Code,2 and the Declaration of Helsinki.3 Among them, they furnish the objective guidelines needed by clinical investigators.
What follows here is a summary of a discussion held in Spring 1972.t It presents the best opinion of the Committee and tries, also, to include the areas about which individuals on the committee are undecided or not in agreement. It should be noted that this discussion was held prior to the suggested changes in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare regulations for protecting human subjects, as published in the Federal Register of October 9 and November 16, 1973.
Special Considerations for Research in Serious and

Critical Illness
Of all the activities in which physicians engage, clinical research is, without question, one of the most delicate and sensitive. And, in this regard, studies of serious and critical illness have particular implications because of several characteristics that are unique to them. For example, the time available for certain types of investigation is often sharply limited. A general statement would be that, here, time and fThe expressions expressed in this article are those of the Committee and are not to be interpreted as an official position of the American Heart Association. severity of the condition are reciprocals; the more severe the illness, the less the time for studies to understand the illness and the quicker must therapeutic measures be applied. Another consideration relates to the patient who is often too ill to understand the nature of the study, is highly dependent on the therapeutic setting, and cannot give a truly informed, free consent. Yet another unique feature is that the patient's ultimate fate is unpredictable; at the worst, there is a statistical chance of death, and at the least, a realistic chance of permanent disability.
Definitions
For the purposes of this discussion, the Committee decided on a number of definitions.
First, it was important to define serious and critical illness. Serious illness was taken to be one which can result in death or significant disability if its course does not end in a certain number of days or weeks. A serious illness can progress to a critical illness. Critical illness was considered to be immediately life threatening. Implicit in these definitions is potential curability and thus they are differentiated from incurable illnesses such as terminal malignancies. Further, they are differentiated from chronic illness in regard to the time available for investigative procedures and therapy, although it is recognized that a chronic illness can become a serious or critical illness at any time.
Examples of serious illness in the cardiovascular field are: transient ischemic attacks, crescendo angina, moderately severe congestive heart failure from any cause, subacute or acute bacterial endocarditis, hypertensive encephalopathy in the early stages, malignant hypertension, preeclampsia, and phlebothrombosis.
Examples of critical cardiovascular illness are acute stroke, acute myocardial infarction, acute left ventricular failure from any cause, acute bacterial endocarditis with valve destruction, ventricular tachycardia, acute heart block, left atrial myxoma, hypertensive encephalopathy with coma, eclampsia, dissecting aortic aneurysm, and pulmonary embolus. The Committee also recognized the need for general definitions of the types of clinical research. Pure research was taken as that carried out to provide new knowledge concerning illness. Therapeutic research was considered to be investigation of the efficacy of an existing treatment or the development of a new treatment. Innovative therapy is an extension of therapeutic research and was defined as any treatment based on a biological principle not previously applied to the condition in question. It is obvious from these definitions that pure research relates to the acquisition of knowledge for the benefit of all patients affilicted with a particular illness and not necessarily the individual patient participating in the study and that therapeutic research is carried out for the purpose of benefiting him personally. These definitions point up the basic ethical conflict of all clinical research. This conflict embraces the "good" of the individual (the patient) and the "good" of society. It is this conflict that makes clinical research a delicate and sensitive issue and in clinical research regarding serious or critical illness, the issue may become a poignant one as well. Moreover, not only is there so much at stake for the patient and for all subsequent patients who may become so afflicted but also the legal and ethical responsibilities of the investigator are brought into sharp focus.
General Legal Principles
The one theme which recurs throughout all the guidelines, principles, and codes of medical ethics available is the doctrine of informed consent. It is clear that the first legal responsibility of the physician who carries out pure or therapeutic research in a serious or critical illness is to obtain consent from the patient or someone competent to represent him. In addition to obtaining this consent, the physician has the responsibility to give the patient good medical care and to exercise good judgment in the execution of the care and research programs. There are four factors which alter the degree of legal responsibility in such studies as well as in clinical research generally:
1) The nature of the experimentwhether research is conducted solely to acquire new knowledge without possibility for therapeutic benefit for the patient, or whether therapeutic research is carried out with the hope of bringing immediate individual benefit. The former carries a greater legal responsibility than the latter.
2) The "radicalism" of the therapythat is, the degree to which it deviates from accepted methods.
3) The prognosis associated with the patient's illness under conventional therapy.
4) The degree of illness at the time of the study: the justification for taking risks in treatment increases as the patient's illness becomes more critical. From the foregoing it is obvious that legal liability is greater when a study is done to gain knowledge for the benefit of society (pure research) than when it is carried out for the immediate benefit of the patient (therapeutic research). In either case, the important safeguard for the physician is a detailed statement, signed by the patient, consenting to the contemplated procedures. If something is done without consent, the patient need not prove that it was done improperly; he can bring action for assault. The signed consent is evidence that the patient did, in fact, agree to the procedure and thus it removes the essential element of an assault.
The obtaining of informed consent from seriously or critically ill patients or their relatives is quite a different matter than obtaining it from normal persons or patients not so severely ill. It carries such importance that it will be dealt with separately in a subsequent section. For the time being, it is sufficient to note that seriously or critically ill patients may not be able to comprehend a detailed explanation of research procedures to be carried out and this puts an even greater responsibility upon physicians in these cases than in the conduct of clinical research in less severely ill or normal individuals.
In carrying out therapeutic research, the physician/investigator is potentially liable for a bad result, and as suggested above, his responsibility is greater when there already exists a safe, accepted way of dealing with the patient's condition. The earliest decision on record concerned with therapeutic research was handed down in 1871 in settlement of a suit brought by a patient against a physician who unsuccessfully attempted to treat a fractured leg by a new methodapparently a crude sort of traction apparatus.4 This decision is still the law. It states in part that "Some standards by which to determine the propriety of treatment must be adopted; otherwise, experiments will take the place of skill and the reckless experimentalist the place of the educated, experienced practitioner. When the case is one in which a system of treatment has been followed for a long time, there should be no departure from it unless the surgeon is prepared to take the risk of establishing by his success the propriety and safety of his experiment." This decision implies that failure of a new therapeutic approach is unacceptable, yet every accepted form of treatment must have at some time been tried for the first time. Waltz and Inbau5 suggest the following considerations in determining whether therapeutic research is justified: 1) the present and predicted course of the disease, 2) the probability of success of accepted therapy, 3) the type and severity of risks associated with the new therapy. After listing these considerations they conclude with the following warning: "The potential innovator must justify his actions against the background of professional judgment concerning an already tried and accepted therapy." Some protection against malpractice suits is provided the physician who reviews his therapeutic research plan with his colleagues before employing it Circulation, Volume 50, December 1974 because part of the legal test for malpractice is whether or not the physician has departed from accepted norms or standards. If, in the opinion of the doctor's peers, the plan is well founded and has good chance for success, then it is not an undue deviation from accepted norms. This, then, points up the advantage of having the advice and counsel of an Institutional Review Committee such as is now required by the Institutional Guide to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) Policy on Protection of Human Subjects. 6 In regard to the legal requirements of pure research, the studies planned must conform to various accepted codes for human experimentation (e.g., AMA, Nuremberg, Helsinki) and, in this country, to the DHEW guidelines. The investigator must be prepared to demonstrate the scientific validity of the studies to be undertaken and be able to show that appropriate safeguards have been taken against all known and anticipated risks. Finally, the investigator must have proof that the patient, or an appropriate relative, voluntarily agreed to the study with full knowledge of its purpose and the hazards attendant to it.
Roles and Responsibilities of the Clinical Investigator
The clinical investigator who studies serious or critical illness takes on a responsibility of great magnitude. To the patient he owes an assurance of the best possible medical care but in seeking to provide new information of high quality to help this patient and all future patients, he must carefully plan and execute a proper study. Thus, the basic conflict of clinical science is perhaps best understood against a background discussion of the types of endeavor that comprise clinical research.
There is the passive, observational type, in which the course of an illness or an episode in a disease is assessed using sequential measurements of blood, urine, cerebrospinal fluid, gastric contents, or other products of the body that are obtained in the course of medical care. In this type the investigator makes no attempt to modify treatment or the physiologic abnormalities that characterize the disease. This type is wholly incidental to the care of the patient. There is another form of observational research which can be termed active. This type requires instrumentation in order to obtain samples or to make recordings of physiologic variables. For example, catheters or other recording devices are inserted into the vascular system, into cerebral ventricles or subarachnoid space, the urinary bladder or the gastrointestinal tract. Depending upon the skill of the investigator and the complexity of the instrumentation, varying amounts of time will be required before measurements can be made. This type of research may also be incidental to the care of the patient. Often in clinical investigation, there is another form of active observational research protocol which entails some type of physiologic manipulation which is not incidental to the illness. Such manipulations are used to learn how the variables of disease differ from those of health, either qualitatively or quantitatively, or whether responses to these physiologic manipulations can define prognosis. Therapeutic research and/or innovative therapy seek to provide better modes of therapy and for the purpose of this discussion would involve either passive or active observational procedures.
There seems little ethical question about passive, observational studies in seriously or critically ill patients since they entail no modification of a treatment schedule. The only thing required for such research to be valid is, of course, that appropriate control observations are made to provide a background for assessing any change that occurs during therapy. In considering active observational research, the question of time available becomes an issue. Since the instrumentation necessary for making the observations requires varying amounts of time, the investigator has to assess whether treatment can be safely postponed long enough to accomplish this and whether additional risk may arise.
In regard to research involving physiologic manipulations, again time and severity are at issue. Since the first responsibility is to give the patient the best of medical care, the question must be asked whether this type of research is applicable to the study of serious or critical illness. This is because an additional physiologic "load" may exceed the limits of the patients' compensatory mechanisms. This, of course, is a question which must be answered by the investigator. Therapeutic research and/or innovative treatment require that appropriate control measurements be made in order that scientific requirements are met. The investigator may find himself on the horns of a dilemma when faced with a critically ill patient for whom existing modes of therapy are imperfect but who is so ill that conventional treatment cannot be postponed until control observations are obtained. In such a situation the considerations of Waltz and Inbau5 presented in the previous section are certainly germane: 1) the present and predicted course of the disease, 2) the probability of success of accepted therapy, 3) the type and severity of risks associated with the innovative therapy; and, we would add, 4) an estimate of its probability of beneficial effect.
Physician/Investigator and Physician/Friend
How best can the clinical investigator meet the patient's requirement for the best possible medical care and clinical science's and society's requirement for the best possible research? In view of some, the clinical investigator, being both a physician and scientist, should provide both. However, Guttentag's7 view differs for he has recommended that "research and care should not be pursued by the same person, but should be kept distinct. The physician-friend and the physician-experimenter would be two different persons as far as the patient is concerned.
The responsibility for the patient would rest, during the experimental period, with the physician-friend, unless the patient decided differently. Retaining his original physician as personal advisor, the patient would at least be under less conflict than he is at present when the question of experimentation arises.'
It is worthwhile to consider this suggestion against the background of the types of clinical investigation. In passive, observational research the physicianexperimenter might act as the laboratory supervisor and be responsible for the collection of specimens while the physician-friend would provide care. This system is workable if the two physicians are in close contact and if the specimens to be studied are obtained at optimal times. The potential disadvantage is, of course, that the samplings might be done at inappropriate times so that no clear picture of the course of the illness nor of response to treatment could be obtained. On the other hand, if the physician is both friend and investigator, there is ongoing involvement, both with the question to be answered and the treatment of the patient. In active observational research, the separation of roles is practical if the physicianfriend has as great an interest in the study as the physician-investigator and if the physicianinvestigator has as much concern for the patient's care as the physician-friend. In research which involves physiologic manipulations (if such is ever indicated in seriously or critically ill patients), the separation of roles is yet more difficult. In such clinical situations, physiologic manipulations have the possibility of ultimate benefit, but they also may produce a deleterious effect which would require that the manipulation be immediately discontinued or counteracted. In order to provide this assurance, it would be difficult or impossible to separate the role of physician-friend from physician-investigator because the study and the care of the patient are so closely linked.
When the research involves new forms of therapy, the separation of roles again is open to question. This is because the physician-friend would have to take the responsibility for treatment and must know as well as the physician-investigator knows both the observations to be made and what to do if untoward developments occur. In a sense, the term "therapeutic research" denies the separation of roles because the treatment is part of the research and the research, part of the treatment.
Further Considerations of Clinical Research and Clinical Researchers
Certainly, if patient care is to be improved, clinical research must continue but in seriously or critically ill patients choice of the studies that may be carried out can be a difficult one, with constraints often depending on the reciprocals of time and severity. An example of the choices that must be made, the dilemmas that often arise, and investigators' ways of handling such situations, is provided by the question of whether it is ever ethical to postpone treatment of a critically ill patient to allow time for preparing for control observations and carrying them out. Some hold the view that it behooves anyone who believes in the efficacy of therapeutic measures to institute that treatment immediately and not delay it for research purposes.
There are, however, experienced physicians who may believe that none of the forms of treatment available for a particular critical illness are effective nor critically time-dependent. For those " uncommitted" physicians the ethical issue may be different. This, in turn, raises the question whether the effectiveness of a therapy really is to be judged by our belief in it. Here, the choice may be between orthopraxy (doing the regular thing) and orthodoxy (believing the regular thing). While these are not necessarily exclusive, neither are they necessarily compatible. Orthopraxy has built into it a precedentfollowing kind of behavior, for examplethe dose of a drug is such-and-such, the treatment of this lesion is a surgical procedure. In contrast, orthodoxy is much more connected with ideas that underlie faith and it involves in medicine an act of the intellect and an act of belief. The term "commitment to therapy" implies that one does not necessarily know whether the given method works but sincerely believes that it offers the patient the best chance. An individual's commitment to such treatment could arise from his commitment to following the rules as a habit or be the result of his faith in what he is doing. In regard to therapeutic research in the seriously, and most particularly, the critically ill patient, the distinction between orthodoxy and orthopraxy is a key issue. The orthopractic attitude in a sense does not accept new responsibility; rather it follows the accepted procedures, whether believed in or not. The physician feels he has no choice. The consciously orthodox physician, on the other hand, makes choices and he may choose to deviate from orthopraxy.
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There are physicians who are orthopractic without deep conviction in what they do (in a given situation) and those who both believe and do the fashionable thingand even those who do unusual things under a burden of conviction approaching an orthodoxy (e.g., performing a surgical procedure that has not been irrefutably proven to be of value but seems preeminently rational).
Much of the purpose of these distinctions between orthopraxy and orthodoxy is to make the point that research is conceptually a trial of the rejection of orthopraxis and an effort to confirm, extend, or alter orthodoxy. That is, orthodoxy and orthopraxy are not good enough for the investigator. Research is a disciplined unorthodoxy and/or unorthopraxy.
Informed Consent Protection for the Patient
The doctrine of informed consent, as applied to clinical investigation, serves to assure that the patient is not participating against his will nor in ignorance in any research involving risk to his health or, in the case of serious or critical illness, to his recoverability. As the term implies, informed consent is consent voluntarily given by the patient (or a competent representative) after having been fully informed of the purpose of the proposed investigation and of all the risks attendant upon it. The patient should understand what is being asked of him and must voluntarily agree to cooperate. Furthermore, he must realize that he has the right to withdraw from the study at any time. For studies in seriously or critically ill patients, obtaining informed consent poses a difficult problem.
The basic elements of informed consent are familiar to all investigators. They have been set down in the DHEW guidelines6 and for the purpose of this discussion they will be paraphrased here: 1) a fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, 2) a description of the attendant discomforts and risks, 3) a description of the benefits to be expected, 4) a disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures that offer advantage to the patient, 5) an offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures, 6) an instruction that the subject is free to withdraw his consent and discontinue participation in the study at any time. In addition, the agreement, either written or oral, should include no exculpatory language through which the patient is made to waive or appear to waive any of his legal rights or to release the institution or its agents from liability for negligence. Informed consent must be documented.
Protection for the Physician One of the legal aspects of informed consent is the degree of protection against law suits afforded the physician by the patient's consent to whatever study is performed. To carry out an investigative procedure or administer a new drug without obtaining the patient's consent can give rise to an action at law for assault. The general consent signed by most patients on admission to the hospital is inadequate to protect the investigator because blanket consent is too vague and too broad to be truly informed consent.
Having the patient sign a detailed statement giving his consent for investigative procedures does not afford absolute protection to the physician but it does give evidence that the patient did, in fact, permit the doctor to "touch" him. Thus it rules out the possibility of the physician being sued for assault or "unpermitted touching." It does not, however, relieve the physician of responsibilities for studies or procedures negligently done, improperly conceived or inherently dangerous.
If the patient is too ill to understand or is incompetent to do so, the consent of an appropriate person competent to give consent must be obtained before any experimental procedure is carried out. A possible exception might be that of an unconscious patient in serious or critical condition admitted to the hospital with no family to give permission for an innovative therapeutic procedure. Permission, or informed consent, does not have to be obtained for "last chance, life-saving techniques." When all else has failed, the physician is expected to take all reasonable risks that offer a hope of saving a patient's life. The farther away from an emergency, or life-saving procedure, however, the more important it is that the patient consent to treatment. Here again we see the reciprocals of time and severity in regard to investigating seriously and critically ill patients and obtaining informed consent.
Informed Consent Vs. Valid Consent
In the foregoing presentation of benefits of informed consent for patients participating in clinical studies and for clinical investigators as well, we have tried to highlight the difficulties inherent in investigation of serious and critical illness. Two basic problems seem clear. One is with the interpretation of the term itself; the other relates to fulfilling the doctrine when the subject is too ill, or his relatives too distraught to understand. Legal counsel to the committee stated that the law requires only that the information be given to the patient. However, the "spirit of the doctrine" requires that the patient or his proxy understand the information. Thus, the legal requirements of informed consent are less than the ethical requirements. The former require that the patient (or his reasonable agent) be told; the latter, that he understands what he has been told. The DHEW guidelines support the "spirit" as well as the law.
The difficulties involved in reconciling the law and the "spirit" of the doctrine are all too familiar to any clinical investigator, even in the best of circumstances.
The "best of circumstances" is the situation involving a normal volunteer or an intelligent patient who is not particularly uncomfortable. Even then, after a full explanation, the reply may be "'I don't understand all that. You do what you think is best." It is obvious to us all that many patients do not have the background or inclination necessary to grasp fully even an elementary explanation of what is involved in an experimental procedure. When the patient is seriously or critically ill, the difficulties are compounded. Not only is the patient likely to be too sick to understand, but also relatives are often too preoccupied with concern and worry to understand. They may well take the "you do what you think is best" approach. Further, consent may not be entirely freely given in the sense that they may feel that refusal to participate will lessen the physician-investigator's interest in the patient and diminish the quality of care, thereby. Such, indeed, is the condition of great dependency created by serious and critical illness, not only in the patient but also in his relatives.
The patient-advocate Faced with this difficulty, the problem arises what is to be done. Usually, in the establishment of guidelines for protecting the rights of individuals involved in clinical investigation, the limited potential for understanding (valid) as opposed to informed consent is not addressed. This problem, which may be very real even in "the best of circumstances," becomes crucial in serious and critical illness. The Committee discussed the possibility that the investigator might find some help toward assuring valid consent through participation of a third person, a patient-advocate, who would understand the studies to be performed, yet not have a vested interest in obtaining the information. He (or she) would discuss the procedures planned with the patient and/or relatives in addition to, and not in place of, the investigator and would also continue to serve as necessary in this role throughout the course of the study. Such ongoing participation by the patient-advocate would give the investigator assurance that consent is a continuing process and would help to reassure the patient and/or his family that he can withdraw from the study at any time. At times his role would be to assist in refusal of consent.
Who can serve as the patient-advocate? In general, it would seem that it could be anyone who is knowledgeable enough to understand both the science and the ethics involved, is truly interested, will take the time to fulfill the responsibility and feels sufficiently independent of the investigator to disagree effectively, if this should be necessary. For instance, this could be the patient's referring physician, another staff member, a house officer, or a nurse. With the latter two, care should be taken to assure that they are, themselves, not in a position of dependency on the investigator for this could interfere with their ability to express independent judgments.
Informed Consent for Research in Ill Children Because children are in such a position of dependency, the difficulty of obtaining valid consent for investigations of their serious and critical illnesses is only greater than if they were not so ill. This additional difficulty relates in part to the concern, worry and, at times, guilt feelings of their parents. It is the experience of pediatric clinical investigators that parents often comprehend only a part of what is being told them and, if they feel that consent to perform a study will improve the care of their child, they will give that consent without a true understanding of what is involved. Ethical requirements of informed consent demand that every effort should be made to obtain free, understanding (valid) consent insofar as possible. Thus, in children sick in any degree, one is faced with much the same problems as in the study of critically and seriously ill adults. Here also, the investigator may find it helpful to involve a patientadvocate who will represent the patient and his parents, will be sure that they understand as much as they are capable of at that time, and that, if the study is carried out, the consent is ongoing.
